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IS SPECIAL AVIATION LIABILITY
LEGISLATION ESSENTIAL? -PART 11*
By EDWARD C. SWEENEY
Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce; Professor of Law, Northwestern University (On leave of absence), and Editor of the JOURNAL.

T HE'"AFTER"
need for remedial aviation liability legislation to be applicable
accidents occur should in no way

be confused with the
need for safety measures "BEFORE" accidents occur, i.e., of developing
safer aircraft, training better pilots and formulating more effective
traffic and airport control.
Accident records show that substantial progress has been made
in decreasing the rate of accident frequency. This improvement
should continue in all forms of civil aviation. Notwithstanding, considering the presence of human error and of mechanical failure, and
the hazards of atmospheric disturbances, there will always remain the
possibility of accidents as long as man flies by mechanical means.
"AFTER" the accident happens, no amount of prevention or safety
measures can undo the resulting damage. From that point on, the
Federal Government or the States, through their respective legislatures, should implement the accident prevention program by a judicial process which will provide compensation to the victims of aviation
accidents commensurate with the importance of the social problem
involved.
In Part I of this Article eight factual and legal issues were considered dealing with interrelated arguments that have been advanced
in support of andin opposition to the adoption in the United States
of special aviation liability legislation. This discussion was condensed
from the writer's study for the CAB, published in 1941, and at that
point in the discussion of issues it had been shown that the common
law rules of negligence and proximate cause applicable to torts on
land and to passengers of common carriers were not particularly well
adapted to accidents occurring in any modern form of transportation.
In an alarming percentage of accidents the victim fails to recover what
he should, and in a few cases he receives more than compensatory damages due to fortuitous circumstances which frequently have little or
nothing to do with his deserts or the merits of his claims. Expense,
delay, and uncertainty of the application of common law principles
do in fact work hardship upon plaintiffs in all transportation negligence suits.
However ill adapted these common law rules appear, this writer's
* Continued from 19 J. AiR L. & C. 166 (1952).
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original study for the CAB recognized that these rules were working
out as satisfactorily with respect to aircraft accidents, and only as
satisfactorily, as these same "old" rules have worked out for other
modern forms of transportation. The 1941 study discredited the contention that there are fundamental grounds for according aviation
accidents a treatment different from that which should be accorded
to railroad, motor bus, and private automobile accidents. As a result,
aviation liability legislation must be looked upon as an effort, in one
field of transportation, to effect a reform or improvement of rules of
tort liability along lines which might be equally suited to other forms
of modern transportation. The fact that any legislation recommended
for modernizing aviation liability standards and procedures may have
ramifications in other fields of transportation should be no reason for
delaying its application to aviation if found presently desirable for the
victims of aircraft accidents, for the aviation industry, and for the
general public.
Less serious social adjustments will have to be made in putting
into effect legislation embodying radical changes in the principles of
liability governing aviation torts than if such principles affected other
common forms of transportation because (1) air transportation, as
an industry, is relatively smaller and is still in its developmental period
as compared with the railroad and bus industries, (2) private aircraft
are not yet as commonly used as private automobiles, and (3) due to
these conditions, the total number of casualties and the total value
of property damage attributable to civil aviation is relatively small
compared with other forms of transportation.
There remains to consider, in Part II of this article the issue of
constitutionality of special aviation liability legislation and the merits
of incorporating such a proposal in a federal rather than a uniform
state statute. These are numbered issues nine and ten.
9. Do ConstitutionalLimitations Render Invalid Either State or Federal Remedial Aviation Liability Legislation Embodying a System
of Limited Compensation?
A. Contentions Supporting State Legislation. Any system of uniform state legislation predicated upon principles of absolute limited
liability and compulsory insurance is certain to give rise to questions
of its validity under the Federal and State Constitutions. In general
a state aviation liability statute would be a proper exercise of the State's
police power in the absence of congressional legislation. This is merely
the equivalent of saying that the State is competent to enact legislation
governing tort liability as a means of preserving the public health and
safety.
The reported cases support the proposition that the imposition of
absolute liability upon the aircraft operator would not be a denial of
due process of law under the Federal Constitution, if it can successfully
be contended that the operation of aircraft is an ultrahazardous activity
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as to the persons for whose benefit absolute liability is imposed. The
peculiar nature-of the hazards imposed and the inability of the person
exposed to it to protect himself in the exercise of reasonable care seems
to be the constitutional basis for the imposition of absolute liability.
That aviation ranks as an ultrahazardous activity is the opinion expressed in the Restatement of the Law of Torts (1938) . There is little
or no precedent indicating whether absolute liability may be imposed
upon the aircraft operator if aviation is not classified as an ultrahazardous activity.
The equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution would not
inhibit the imposition of such absolute liability upon operators of aircraft so long as no discrimination among operators was involved and all
operators falling within the same classification were treated alike.
No point seems ever to have been made that the imposition of absolute liability upon an interstate carrier by a state statute constituted an
unjust burden upon interstate commerce. It would not seem that such
would be a valid objection if it be determined that the imposition of
such liability is a proper exercise of the police power of the State, for
any regulation of interstate commerce would be purely incidental.
Statutory limitations on recovery for death do not seem to be in
conflict with the United States Constitution, but whether such limitations upon recovery for personal injuries or damage to property are
valid is perhaps open to some question. In the absence of a state constitutional prohibition against legislation limiting the amount of recovery for death, there would seem to be no constitutional question involved in the proposed limitations upon the amount recoverable for the
death of a person on the ground or a passenger in .the plane. With
respect to a statutory limit applicable to non-fatal injuries, the Federal
statutes imposing limitations upon the liabilities of ship owners and
the state statutes limiting the recovery of injured employees under the
Workmen's Compensation Law may be urged as precedents. Neither
of these situations is strictly analogous to the point involved herein
and the question of the right of an injured party to compensatory damages is still undetermined. Limited liability would certainly be contrary to the constitutions of several states and the alternative sections
provided in the proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act of 1938 for
use in such states would themselves be open to challenge on the basis
that they were not inherently voluntary.
As to compulsory insurance imposed upon interstate carriers for the
protection of the public within a state, there seems to be no doubt of
its validity, for the securing of such protection to the public, i.e., third
persons and property on the ground, is a proper exercise of the state
police power and any regulation of interstate commerce which arises
therefrom is purely incidental. However, any attempt to impose upon
interstate carriers the duty of carrying liability insurance for the protection of interstate passengers and shippers would appear to be questionable as being an attempt directly to regulate interstate commerce, and
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as such, invalid under the Federal Constitution. As applied to purely
intrastate carriers, the requirement of either type of insurance would
seem to be a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The comprehensive system of liability established by the proposed Uniform
Liability Act of 1938 in attempting to distribute more equitably the
risks involved in aviation is analagous to the broad social policy upon
which the Workmen's Compensation Laws were upheld.
Contentions Supporting Federal Legislation. The power of Congress extends to the regulation of the liability of air carriers and of
operators of other aircraft coming within the interstate and foreign
commerce grant of power to Congress and other constitutional grants
of power. A valid Federal enactment would have the virtue of avoiding all questions of conflict of law.
The validity of any regulatory statute depends upon. the extent of
the Federal power. Presumably this power extends to the regulation
of all air carriers and other operators of aircraft engaging in "air commerce" as defined in section 1 (3) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
as regards their liability with respect to passengers, cargo, and baggage;
in this connection there is a regulation of interstate commerce per se.
Furthermore, a strong argument can be made on principle, though
it must be admitted that conclusive authority is lacking, that the Federal Government, which owns and maintains the airway facilities in the
interest of safety and of the furtherance of air commerce, may, for the
purpose of promoting these objects, exercise complete control of any
aircraft which enters such airways. Under recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, it would seem that a properly drawn
Federal statute could extend the Federal power still further, so as to
include all aircraft which use any part of the navigable air space of the
United States. In any event, it is clear that once the essential Federal
power to regulate the commerce in question is established the form
of regulation adopted may go beyond purely navigational aspects of the
commerce and impose a variety of conditions not directly relating to
navigation.
There seems to be little question as to the power of Congress to
regulate the rights and liabilities as between an air carrier and passengers carried and the shipper of goods and baggage. Whether Congress
may validly regulate the liability of an interstate operator to persons
and property on the ground cannot be categorically answered. Apparently the regulation of the liability of an air carrier to persons and
property on the ground may even be justified as a regulation of interstate commerce per se if Congress declares that interstate commerce
is involved. Whether or not it would be justified as a means of removing a burden upon interstate commerce is largely dependent upon the
factual situation which could be developed in support of the proposition. This would depend in turn upon whether or not it were possible to convince the courts that the present confused state of the law of
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liability among the various states is in fact a burden upon the operations of interstate carriers.
Any liability statute that Congress may properly enact, if it embraces the principle of absolute liability, would be open to the same
questions under the Fifth Amendment as are involved in similar state
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, limitations
of liability in a Federal statute would involve the same questions as
those heretofore presented in relation to a state statute imposing limitations upon recovery. The power of Congress to require interstate
carriers to carry insurance against liability to passengers and shippers
and to third persons bearing no contractual relation to them is established under the Federal Constitution regardless of whether Congress
has authority to regulate the liability itself.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that all of the principles
embodied in either a State or Federal system of limited compensation,
i.e., absolute liability, limitation of recovery, and compulsory insurance,
must be sustained in order for the system to function. As a result, in
passing upof the constitutionality thereof, a court would very likely
not pass upon the constitutionality of each principle separately, but
would treat each principle as an essential part of a new system of liability designed the better to distribute the losses attributable to civil
aviation. The Workmen's Compensation Laws were treated in this
way by the United States Supreme Court.
Appraisal. The principles of absolute liability and of a maximum
limit on the amount of recovery are the two most important principles
involved in a system of limited compensation and represent the most
radical departure from common law principles. Both Federal and
State legislation embodying these principles are confronted with substantially the same constitutional law problems and none of these difficulties appear to present such obstacles as to render it inadvisable to
recommend legislation incorporating these principles if other considerations make the legislation desirable. With respect to compulsory insurance, a state aviation liability act might be held to create an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. In the light of recent
United States Supreme Court decisions it seems probable that a Federal
act regulating the liability of interstate operators with reference to persons and property on the ground would be upheld.
If a Federal statute comprehends only aircraft employed as instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, there appears little question as to the extent of Federal power. However, it would be desirable
to go further in order to obtain an act that would bring all aircraft
within the scope of a single legislative standard. Although no Federal
act has attempted to regulate all aircraft, recent decisions of the Supreme Court would indicate that Congress has such jurisdiction under
the commerce grant of power, as being a reasonable regulation of instruments utilizing a medium of interstate commerce.
There appears no evident reason in fact or policy why the national
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power over navigable air space should not be coextensive with the
national power over navigable waters. It would therefore seem that
constitutional limitations do not impose insurmountable obstructions
to proposing any reasonable type of a comprehensive system of aviation
liability legislation.
10. Is a Federal Aviation Liability Statute More Desirable Than Any
Form of State Legislation, Whether a Uniform State Act or Not?
A. Contentions Favoring Federal Legislation. Any form of liability legislation is of such a controversial nature that it cannot be
anticipated that it will be adopted by any substantial number of states
for many years and for this reason the desired uniformity of liability
standards will not be attained through state action in the near future.
Even though adopted by all of the states, many state legislatures may
be expected to introduce various modifications, and thus defeat complete uniformity.
Under any system of state laws, unless a uniform act be adopted
by all 48 of the states, there will continue to be present many questions
of conflict of laws. At the present time, the contracts of carriage of
interstate air carriers are subject to varying interpretations as to validity, depending upon the conflict of laws rules in force in the states
wherein the contract is litigated. On the other hand, any attempt by a
state statute to give extra-territorial effect to conditions attached to a
contract of carriage, such as is contained in the proposed Uniform
Liability Act of 1938, would do nothing to clear up the difficulty because of the confusion in the interpretation of the full faith and credit
clause.
A Federal law governing the liability of interstate air carriers and
other aircraft coming within the Federal jurisdiction would not be open
to conflict of laws difficulties for the reason that no state may refuse
to enforce a Federal law regardless of its terms upon the basis that the
public policy of the state is contrary to the enactment of such legislation.
Commercial transportation by aircraft of persons and property is
essentially interstate in character, and the relations of the air carrier
to his passengers should be regulated on a national and not on a state
basis. By a single Federal statute, the enactment of which could probably be secured as easily as the enactment of such a liability statute in
many individual states, a uniform system of liability may be secured
which is applicable to all aircraft coming within the interstate and
foreign commerce power of the Federal Government.
Possible constitutional difficulties involved in enacting Federal aviation liability legislation, including legislation with reference to persons
and property on the ground, may not be regarded as serious in the light
of recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
B. Contentions Favoring State Legislation. The present conflict
of laws difficulties are not serious and have given rise to practically no

SPECIAL LIABILITY LEGISLATION

litigation, and therefore this aspect of the problem can be ignored.
In addition, if state liability legislation is otherwise considered desirable, the conflict of laws difficulties involved therein may perhaps be
eliminated by a Federal act supplementing the state legislation which
would prescribe the effect, pursuant to Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution, of state legislation in the courts of other states. This does not
involve enacting a complete Federal liability statute.
Liability being a matter of common law and dependent upon local
social policy, should be left to the individual state. This is particularly
true of the liability of the aircraft operator to persons and property on
the ground within the state. The regilation of the liability of aircraft
operators, including interstate operators, to persons and property on
the ground, is not within the interstate commerce power of the Federal
Government, and a Federal statute would not extend to the liability
of aircraft operators carrying passengers exclusively in intrastate operations until it is demonstrated that Federal power extends to all phases
of private and intrastate flying. The constitutional difficulties involved
are so serious that it is not desirable to recommend such legislation in
preference to the proposed state legislation.
Appraisal. Uniform State aviation liability legislation is believed
inadvisable for the following reasons:
(1) The vast majority of aircraft operations is undoubtedly
within the power of the Federal Government to regulate, and such
regulation may be effected by the enactment of a single statute;
(2) State legislation in the field of aviation liability would
not bring about uniformity because the controversial nature of the
proposals involved would prevent uniform adoption.
(3) While the aircraft operators' liability with respect to persons and property on the ground may ordinarily be a proper field
for State legislation, it is believed that such liability may be regu-

lated as an incident of general Federal regulation of aviation liability. Even if it may not be so regulated, the infrequency and
small amount of damage now caused by aircraft to persons and
property on the ground does not warrant the effort of obtaining
uniform legislation by the 48 states, particularly in view of the
fact that persons and property on the ground appear in practice
to receive adequate protection from the courts.
COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL AVIATION LIABILITY ACT RECOMMENDED

The author's- study for the CAB in 1941 concluded that a system
of limited liability, coupled with compulsory insurance, established
by Federal legislation, would be the most feasible and desirable solution of the aviation liability problem and its adoption would be in
the best interest of aviation and the general public. The author recommended, therefore, that the Civil Aeronautics Board recommend
the enactment of a Federal Aviation Liability Act which would be
applicable to all aircraft that may be brought within the scope of the
commerce power of the Federal Government and which would embody
the legal principles hereinafter outlined.
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The Warsaw Convention of 1929 which the United States ratified
in 1934 and which governs certain liabilities of United States airlines
in foreign air transportation, was not recommended as a model to
follow in drafting legislation for domestic flying in the United States.
The standard of liability found in that Convention is somewhat similar to that hereinafter considered, but the phraseology of the translated
text frequently leaves the rights of both injured parties and operators
uncertain and would give rise to much interpretive litigation.
At the outset it should be emphasized that the comprehensive federal legislative program recommended in 1941 was looked upon then
as a completely new method of handling claims for damages arising
from civil aviation accidents and it was urged that the several legal
principles involved should be considered as integral and inter-related
parts of the system. This inter-relation will appear from the following
discussions. The constitutionality of the entire system, rather than of
its component parts, should be the subject of inquiry if the suggested
legislation is challenged.
A.
(1)

Standards of Liability in Recommended Federal Statute
Persons on the Ground.

(a) Persons on the ground (not on a landing area of an established airport) should be compensated for injuries directly attributable
to the operation of aircraft, irrespective of the aircraft operators' negligence. This should include injuries and damages due to forced
landings, crashes or objects or persons falling from aircraft in flight,
but not necessarily claims arising from the alleged nuisance of ordinary flight. It is believed that the imposition of absolute liability by
legislation under such circumstances involves no departure from law
as it is now developing. As far as is known, the courts have consistently
rendered judgments for the plaintiffs and have held the aircraft operator liable for direct, and generally consequential damages, in all cases
of direct contact by aircraft with innocent persons and property on
the ground who were not at the time on an established landing area.
The proposal would also have the desired effect of eliminating the
confusion in legal theories prevailing in the decisions of the courts
that have considered this liability.' Important as the continued development of civil aviation is believed to be, no convincing reason has
been presented why it should be subsidized at the expense of the
1 The legal theories are not always clear upon which the liability of the afrcraft operator for crashes and forced landings has been established. Both a
"crash," occurring while the aircraft is completely out of control of the pilot,
and a "forced landing," may be considered a "privileged trespass" for the purpose of saving life and under common law doctrine an operator in such a case
may only be liable for actual damages. Or the crash may be considered an

unintentional and non-negligent entry, and therefore, an "accidental intrusion"
for which no liability results at common law unless aviation is classified as an
"ultra-hazardous" activity. Of course, if negligence on the part of the operator
is proved, liability is established.
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luckless victim on the ground who, without participating in aviation
in any way, is injured by an aircraft accident even though not attributable to the fault of the operator.
(b) Persons who voluntarily go upon the landing area of an
established airport ordinarily do so with knowledge of its use by aircraft, and assume certain risks of accidental harm to themselves. They
should, therefore, be entitled to recover only when the aircraft operator is negligent, i.e., fails to exercise ordinary care. This should include other aircraft on the airport ramp and on the taxi-ways, including their passengers. This recommendation likewise does not involve
a departure from present law.
(2)

Passengers and Guests of Common Carriers by Air and Private
Aircraft.
(a) Passengers of Common Carriersby Air, in voluntarily selecting .air transportation, assume certain risks of unavoidable harm, and
as a result it is believed that "common carriers" by aircraft should
not by legislation be made responsible to their passengers for injuries
attributable to such risks. Accordingly the injured passenger is entitled to no compensation whenever the operator can show that the
accident was due to vis major (Act of God), or the negligent act of
a person not associated with the operator. Conversely the revenue
and the non-revenue passenger should be permitted to recover when
his injury is due to the operator's failure to exercise the highest degree
of care for his safety. This standard should be applicable to both
revenue and non-revenue passengers. The imposition of absolute
liability to passengers in the manner suggested by the 1938 Uniform
State Aviation Liability Code does not appear necessary in order to
remove the serious difficulties and uncertainties now encountered by
passenger plaintiffs in aircraft negligence suits.
The burden of persuasion should be fixed so that the airplane
operator would be liable in a suit brought by the passenger unless the
operator proves affirmatively and convinces the trier of the facts that
the injury or death of his passenger(a) did not approximately result from his failure to live up
to the standard of care indicated, or
(b) was in part due to the, wilful misconduct of the passenger or his failure to obey reasonable regulations of the operator actually brought to the passenger's attention.
In considering the constitutionality of a statute embodying this
standard of liability it is believed that it should be looked upon as
The American Law Institute, in its Restatement of the Law of Torts,
classified aviation as an ultra-hazardous activity for which absolute liability
attaches for injury to third persons or property. Many legal scholars and jurists
do not accept the ultra-hazardous classification of aviation, but agree that the
aviator should be liable, regardless of his own fault, to the innocent person he
injures on the surface of the earth.
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more than a procedural change and should be considered a change
in the substantive standard of liability, i.e., absolute liability with
recognized defenses upon presentation of specified proof. Under the
standard of liability suggested, the injured passenger or his representative would not hesitate to bring a suit in court if an unreasonably
low settlement was offered by the aircraft operator or his insurer. Prewar studies of government accident files, which were made to determine the percentage of total passenger accidents due to the negligence
of the operator, give little indication of the percentage of passenger
claims that could be successfully established under such a standard of
liability. However, under the recommended standard it is difficult to
see how more than a small percentage, not over 10% to 20% of fatal
claims, would be defeated. Efforts now being made to promote safety
by all parties interested in civil aviation should and do tend to reduce
the number of accidents due to vis major and undetermined causes,
and as accidents become progressively fewer the proportion that will
be due to human failure of the flight personnel or others controlling
the actual operation of the aircraft may be expected to become more
numerous. The statute should, insofar as practicable, define what is
meant by the "highest degree of care."
(b) Revenue Passengers of Private Air Carriers should be permitted to recover where their injuries are due to the operator's failure
to exercise "ordinary care" under the particular circumstances. The
burden of persuasion should be fixed in the same manner as heretofore suggested with respect to passengers of air carriers. The private
operator would therefore be liable unless he proves affirmatively that
the injury or death of his passenger (a) did not approximately result
from his failure to live up to the standard indicated, or (b) was in
part due to the contributory negligence or wilful misconduct of the
passenger or to his failure to obey reasonable regulations of the operator actually brought to the passenger's attention. It would be advisable for the statute to indicate the difference between "highest degree
of care" and "ordinary care" and perhaps between "common carrier"
and "private carrier."
(c)
Guests of Private Aircraft Operatorsassume all ordinary risks
of air travel and should be permitted to hold the operator liable only
for injuries due to his. "gross negligence" or "wilful misconduct," such
as flying intentionally or negligently in violation of Civil Air Regulations. By the term "private carrier" we include commercial and
non-commercial operators. The burden of persuasion should be upon
the passenger to prove the fault of the operator, and contributory
negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the passenger should
be defenses available to the operator.
(3)

Property on the Ground and Property Carried in Aircraft

(a) With respect to damage to property on the ground the air
craft operator should be liable regardless of negligence as he is in the
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case of persons on the ground. (b) With respect to loss of or damage
to baggage and personal effects of aircraft passengers, the operator
should be liable according to the same standards and under the same
necessity of proof as govern his liability to the person of the passenger
whose baggage and personal effects are involved. (c) With respect.
to goods shipped by aircraft, including air express, the liability of the
air carrier should be the same as that of the surface carrier, i.e., generally that of an insurer where the common carrier status is established.
No standard of liability should be established by statute with respect
to mail carried pursuant to arrangements with the postal administration of a government.
(4)

Liabilities Arising Out of Collision of Two or More Aircraft

(a) Passengers and Shippers shoud be permitted to recover from
the operator of the aircraft which each uses in accordance with the
principles set forth in section A (2) and A (3). With respect to the
liability of the operator of the other aircraft involved in the collision,
the passengers or shippers of the first aircraft should be entitled to
recover from the second operator only when they can prove that the
other operator failed to exercise the required standard of care. In
this case, the burden of persuasion should be on the claimants to
show negligence.
(b) Persons and Property on the Ground. In the first instances,
each operator should be liable regardless of negligence, for the damage caused by his own aircraft to persons and property on the ground.
This liability should extend to the proximate damages due to the
faulty navigation of one aircraft causing a second aircraft to crash
although the first continues in flight. If injury and damage on the
ground is due to the impact of both aircraft, and the damage caused
by each cannot be established, both aircraft operators should be jointly
and severally liable.
(c) Operators, as Against Each Other. Between the operators
involved in a collision of aircraft the liability of the one to the other
should be predicated upon the principle of comparative negligence
and the damages so prorated between operators should include the
damages to each aircraft, to passengers and flight personnel and to
persons and property on the ground. The degree of care owed by
each operator to the other is that of ordinary care under the circumstances. When the aircraft collision is due to the negligence of one
of the operators, that operator alone should be liable to the other
operator. If the collision is due to the negligence of both operators,
the liability of one to the other should be in proportion to the comparative degree of each operator's negligence.
The principle of comparative negligence is found in admiralty
practice and in dealing with marine collisions is considered superior
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to the common law rule of contributory negligence. This principle
is suggested here because of the apparent similarity between the liability of operators of aircraft and of ships arising out of collisions.
The amounts involved will usually be large, especially if losses have
occurred to passengers and to property on the ground. It is recognized
that it will be difficult for the courts to weigh and determine the de.grees of negligence of several operators, as the proximate causes of
aircraft collisions do not lend themselves to comparative measurement.
When such difficulties are insurmountable following the admiralty
rule, the statute should provide for the equal sharing of liability, up
to the respective limits of liability hereinafter suggested. When there
is considerable difference in the value of the aircraft the principle
works to the disadvantage of the operator with the less valuable craft.
However, this result seems preferable to the common law rule of
contributory negligence which leaves each party to bear his own loss
even though the collision would have occurred had one operator not
committed (or omitted) what the court considered mere contributory
negligence.
(5)

Scope of Substantive Liability Provisions of Recommended
Federal Statute

The standard of liability and the burden of proof suggested for
each of the foregoing situations should be made exclusively applicable
by the Federal Statute to all aircraft coming within the purview of
the Commerce power of the Federal Government. The statute should
expressly provide that this include all aircraft (a) engaged in interstate or foreign commerce at the time of the accident (including within
this particular category all interstate and foreign flights), (b) reasonably classified as "instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce," i.e., aircraft generally operated in interstate or foreign commerce, or (c) being flown in the navigable airspace or on a designated
civil airway of the United States. Few, if any, aircraft will fail to
come within one of these categories, but, of course, the liability of
aircraft not coming therein would not come within the scope of the
statute.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate
that the court would uphold the imposition of the foregoing standards
of liability with respect to the above enumerated classes of aircraft
operators as a reasonable regulation of interstate commerce per se,
and also as a proper regulation of intrastate activities designed to relieve interstate commerce of the burden of conflicting local tort
liability. Such legislation may also be considered as a "condition"
which Congress may prescribe as an incident to the exercise of its
power under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
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B.

Measure of Damages and Limitation on Recovery in
Recommended Federal Statute

Damages to all persons and pioperty should be compensatory
only, and, except with respect to the minimum liability suggested for
death and weekly benefits, should depend upon proof of injury, disability, dependence or earning capacity, i.e., the common law measure
of damages prevailing in the state wherein the injury occurred. Gross
negligence on the part of the operator or his servants should not
deprive the operator of the benefits of the suggested statutory limits
2
upon the amount of damages recoverable.
(1)

Limit of damages with Respect to any one Passenger or Other
Person.

For the death of all persons, both passengers and persons on the
ground, directly attributable to the operation of aircraft, there should
be a minimum and maximum limit placed upon the amounts recoverable, for example, $2,500 minimum and $20,000 or $30,000 maximum.
With respect to non-fatal injuries to passengers and persons on the
ground directly attributable to the operation of aircraft, recovery
should consist of (a) expenses incurred as a result of the accident to
the extent of $3,000 to $5,000, including hospital, medical, doctor,
ambulance, and nursing services; (b) payment of a fixed amount for
designated dismemberments or the loss of eyesight; and (c) compensation payments during the period of incapacity varying between
specified amounts per week, depending upon the number of dependents and the earning capacity of the injured person at the time of
the accident- say between $20 and $80. For substantial partial disability impairing earning capacity a percentage of such weekly payments should be paid.
Imposition of such limits upon recovery follow the social philosophy of Workmen's Compensation Acts which usually impose a limit
upon recovery for death (as also do many of the "Death by Wrongful
Act" statutes) and limit recovery for non-fatal injuries to an amount
payable weekly during incapacity. Although occasionally hardship
may result from imposing a limit upon the amount recoverable for
a non-fatal injury, it is believed that a pecuniary limit should be
placed upon the obligation of the aircraft operator to compensate and
support the person incapacitated by an aircraft accident. As commercial aircraft become larger and more "crash proof" the proportion
of non-fatal to fatal injuries will probably increase and the total
amount paid out in settlement of non-fatal injury claims will become
correspondingly greater. This indicates the importance of fixing a
2 If penalties are to be provided for wilful misconduct, it seems that they
*should more appropriately take the form of criminal or civil penalties imposed

by public authority, such as those imposed by sections 901 and 902 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938.
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limit upon the amount recoverable for such injuries if a comprehensive system of limited liability is regarded as being generally in the
public interest.
Since aircraft passengers and the persons on the ground who may
be injured by aircraft accidents will come from all stations in life, a
single fixed recovery applicable to all persons would be arbitrary, and
some flexibility in the limit of recovery is desirable. The administration of a system providing for minimum and maximum limits will
involve resort to the courts of law or to a duly authorized administrative agency with jurisdiction to fix the amount of recovery. It is believed that such machinery, operating within the limits suggested, will
satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Theoretically, it
would be advisable to have a Federal Accident Board determine the,
award, but because of the small number of persons injured and killed
by civil aircratf now and in the forseeable future, the advantages to
be derived from having such an agency would not appear to warrant
the administrative expense that would be incurred. As a result the
courts of law should be empowered to fix the award pursuant to
statutory standards.
(2)

Overall Limit of Damages With Respect to All Persons and
Property Injured or Damaged in One Accident

(a) With respect to passengers, there should be no limit upon the
total amount recoverable in any one accident since the liability should
vary in reasonably direct proportion to the number of passengers carried and the revenue derived.
(b) With respect to persons other than passengers, there should
be, in addition to the individual maximum limit, an overall limit on
the amount of recovery per accident depending on the weight of the
aircraft used. This overall limit per accident should be applicable to
the operator's liability to persons on the ground and to his liability
to other operators involved in a collision, particularly in view of the
absolute character of the liability to persons on the ground and the
unlimited amount of the potential hazard. The overall limit should
be fairly high - not less than $50,000 per aircraft for light planes and
should increase by a specified rate as the weight or horsepower increases and in no event should be less than the original cost or value
of the aircraft. As this liability will probably be covered by insurance,
a fixed limit to be insured is essential before the practical problem of
writing insurance can be approached.
Relatively high overall limits will assure recovery to all victims
except in the event of a single accident giving rise to a catastrophy of
great magnitude - possible, but very unlikely. Premiums to insure
the relatively high limits here suggested will probably add only a very
small percentage to the premiums that would be required for much
lower insurance limits under the same standards of liability. This is
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because it is anticipated total settlements for any one accident will
approach the overall top limit only rarely. The average should be
far below the limits, but on the other hand, it is desirable to provide
insurance protection for the catastrophy victims to the extent insurance can reasonably be written.
(3)

Limit of recovery with Respect to Property

(a) Recovery for loss of or damage to personal effects and baggage of passengers should be in the amount of actual loss or damage,
but not to exceed $250 per passenger unless the passenger has declared
and paid for a higher valuation. 3 This liability limit is designed to
cover the value of the personal effects and baggage of the ordinary
airline traveler, and a lower limit would not appear adequate.
(b) Recovery for loss of or damage to, or unreasonable delay
in the delivery of, goods shipped should be in the amount of the
actual loss, but not to exceed $100 for any shipment of 100 pounds
or less in actual weight, or $1.00 per pound for any shipment of more
than 100 pounds, unless the shipper has declared and paid for a higher
valuation.
(c) With respect to liability for delay in delivery of baggage and
goods carried, the carrier shall be liable in the amount of the actual
loss for such loss as might reasonably have been contemplated by the
parties at the time the shipment commenced, but not exceeding the
limits suggested for total loss. No liability should be incurred by the
carrier for failure to make prompt delivery, or for special damage for
loss from delay which would not reasonably have been contemplated
by the parties, unless the need for prompt delivery or the possibility
of special damage was declared by the shipper at the time the contract of carriage was made and an additional rate of compensation
paid, if requested.
(d) For damage to real and personal property on the ground
recovery should be in the amount of the actual loss, but not to exceed
a maximum amount varying according to the weight of the aircraft.
This overall limit per accident should also include the operator's liability to other operators involved in a collision for property damage.
It is believed that the reasons advanced for a limitation on the overall
liability with respect to persons on the ground also justify the limitation suggested with respect to property damage.
(4)

Proration of Claims

When the damage resulting from a given accident exceeds the
applicable overall limit, provision should be made for a pro rata re3 The, proposed Uniform State Liability Act suggests a maximum liability
of $100 for baggage and personal effects, and a Federal Act that was considered
by the A.T.A. Committee suggests $50 for personal effects and a separate $50
limit for baggage. Considering the class of passengers usually carried by the

scheduled air carriers these limits seem too low.
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duction in the individual amounts of recovery to be allowed. This
will happen only in connection with accidents involving persons and
property on the ground or between operators of aircraft involved in
a collision. Since separate maximum liabilities are recommended with
respect to persons and property, and it is contemplated that these
liabilities will be covered by separate provisions in the insurance
policies, there need be no question of applying the proration principle
to personal injury and property damage claims together. Difficulties
may arise where it is necessary to prorate personal injury claims involving single payments for fatalities and periodical payments for nonfatal personal injuries. The final disposition of- this matter will
probably require that non-fatal injury claims be valued according
to designated mortality tables and rates of interest.
(5)

Liability Limited by Contract

The statute should make it illegal for aircraft operators to attempt
to contract with passengers and shippers for a lower limit of liability
than the limits prescribed. The operator should be permitted to contract for higher limits of liability with his passengers.
(6)

Scope of Measure of Damages and Limitation on Recovery
Provisions of Recommended Federal Statute

The foregoing limits of liability and procedural provisions should
be made exclusively applicable to the operation of all aircraft coming
within the purview of the commerce power of the Federal Government. Persons injured by aircraft and desiring to have recourse to
the protection afforded by the insurance hereinafter described (section C) and of the benefits of the standards of liability and methods
of proof provided in the legislation (section A) would of course be
limited in their recovery to the maximums indicated above.
C.

Compulsory Insurance or Other Security Provisions in
Recommended Federal Statute.

(1) A Federal statute should vest a Federal agency with power by
regulation to require all aircraft operators as a condition precedent
to obtaining a certificate of airworthiness for their aircraft to present
satisfactory evidence that the operation of the aircraft in question has
been insured, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the
agency, against the liabilities enumerated in section A and for the
limits set forth in section B.
Aircraft operators, pursuant to regulations of the agency, should
be permitted to file surety bonds or to qualify as self-insurers in lieu
of presenting insurance. Operators for whom the underwriters refuse
to write insurance will of necessity have to comply with the latter
regulations. Operation of aircraft without complying with the regulations relating to insurance and other security promulgated by the
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agency should be made a misdemeanor punishable by fine. The
agency should be vested with power to (1) prescribe the limits of
the insurance coverage (not exceeding the limits set forth in section
B; (2) prescribe the terms of the insurance policies to be issued,
including a specification of defenses that the insurer may interpose
that are not available to the insured; (3) fix the notice to be given
the agency by the insurer before the cancelation of a policy becomes
effective; (4) study and prescribe reasonable minimum and maximum
premium rates; and (5) exempt, after study, designated classes of aircraft operators from the requirement of carrying some or all of the
types of insurance that may be required of other classes of operators.
In the 1941 report of the author to the Civil Aeronautics Board,
he wrote: Nothwithstanding excellent cooperation from all interests
concerned, the writer has been unable to obtain information upon
which he is willing to base a recommendation for a hard and fast system
of compulsory insurance. Therefore it is recommended that the Federal agency, (1) be placed under no duty to impose any insurance
requirements unless and until it has satisfied itself by investigation
that such insurance is presently desirable in the public interest, and
(2) be permitted to exempt classes of operators from the requirements of carrying insurance if the financial burden of carrying such
insurance is found by the agency to be unduly burdensome or otherwise not in the public interest. Probably no insurance need be carried
for the protection of guest passengers, personal effects, baggage, or
goods shipped.
Compulsory insurance is believed to be both desirable and feasible
with respect to the aircraft operator's liability to persons and property
on the ground. It would assure payment of judgments to innocent
third parties and would place the burden of such losses on civil aviation generally, including the traveling public (except exceptional
catastrophies of great magnitude where the damage exceeds the insurance limits prescribed) and not upon the luckless individual victim
or operator.
With respect to all types of insurance, it is believed that there is
now a sufficient number of civil aircraft operators to spread such
losses among the operators by insurance without undue hardship on
any individual operator, including the private flyer. There is little
upon which to base an estimate of the cost of the insurance here suggested, and if such a statute were adopted the initial premium rates
would undoubtedly have to be provisional and vary with actual experience. The satisfactory experience of the Federal Bureau of Motor
Carriers in the administration of the compulsory insurance requirements of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, with respect to interstate
motor carriers is believed to be a better indication of that which may
be anticipated in administering compulsory aviation insurance than
the experiences associated with the Massachusetts State Compulsory
Automobile Security Act.
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(2)

Scope of Compulsory Insurance and Other Security Provisions
of Recommended Federal Statute.

Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 no aircraft may be operated in "air commerce" as defined in section 1 (3) of that Act unless
the operator applies for and receives a certificate of airworthiness for
his aircraft (section 610) . This definition of air commerce is so broad
that as a practical matter all aircraft must obtain certificates of airworthiness before being operated. Tying the insurance requirement
to the certificate of airworthiness is suggested as the most practical
way of assuring that all aircraft required to carry insurance do so before
engaging in any form of flying that comes within the substantive provisions of the statute described in section A (5) and B (6). Under
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court it is believed
that the court would uphold a compulsory insurance requirement as
a condition which Congress may prescribe as an incident to the exercise of its power under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Injured parties, of course, should be denied recourse to the protection afforded by such insurance unless they accept the standard of
liability (section A) and the limits of recovery specified in the Federal law (section B) . Thus, insofar as claimants for damages arising
from aircraft accidents make use of the machinery provided by Federal
law, it will be relatively simple to compel the claimant to be bound by
the limitation of liability as a quid pro quo for obtaining the benefits.
Furthermore, the limits prescribed by the Federal legislation may be
made mandatory in any case where operations are involved which come
within the purview of the commerce power of the Federal Government as hereinbefore explained (section A (5) ).
On the other hand, it should be recognized that there may still
be situations where the Federal Government is without power to prescribe the nature of the liability and the amounts of the recovery for
a given aircraft accident. In such cases, either the injured person or
the aircraft operator may insist that the claim for damages be governed by common law rules. In this event, the plaintiff would be
deprived of the methods of proof provided in the legislation, and the
defendant would lose the benefit of the limitation upon recovery. It
is contemplated, however, that the insurance which the aircraft operator may be required to carry would be broad enough to cover his
common law liability in amounts equal to the amounts recoverable
under the statute. Such claims would constitute a relatively small
proportion of all claims and consequently the effect on insurance premiums should be slight. Indeed, it may be supposed that as a matter
of practice both underwriter and insured would prefer that policies
be written in terms broad enough to cover not only the statutory
liability but also all other claims.
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D.

Administrative and General Provisions in Recommended
Federal Statute.

The statute should provide that the district courts of the United
States would have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the
proposed legislation. The court first obtaining jurisdiction of a suit
arising out of an accident should be given exclusive jurisdiction of
all suits arising out of that accident and provision should be made
for consolidating suits filed in other Federal districts. A provision
should specify that the liability imposed by the statute would survive
the aircraft operator's death. A limitation upon the time within which
suit may be brought should be specified. The statute should define
the terms "passenger," "operator," "highest degree of care," "air commerce," and other terms.
ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL

LEGISLATION

RECOMMENDED.

A legislative program embodying limited liability coupled with
compulsory insurance, such as recommended in the foregoing section,
presents administrative and legal problems that cannot be easily dismissed. The program here recommended is believed workable, however, insofar as the traveling and general public is concerned, most of
the benefits of this program may be secured by a much simpler legislative program.
Compulsory Admitted Liability Insurance Required by Federal
Legislation. (a) This alternate program would vest a Federal agency
with power by regulation to require aircraft operators, either generally
or by selected classes, and by the means suggested in section C (1), to
carry "admitted" liability insurance with respect to revenue passengers, persons and property on the ground, or others, as the agency
may determine. This insurance would be payable directly to the
injured party, or his representative, upon proof that his injury was
directly due to the operation of the particular aircraft in question,
regardless of the circumstances of impact, upon condition that such
recipient execute a valid release of all claims against the insured and
against all persons acting on his behalf. 4 Under such a statute the
injured party, or his representative, would have the option of rejecting the accident insurance and of suing at common law for an unlimited amount of damages. To cover this contingency the policy
would be written so as to cover the common law liability of the operator up to the admitted liability policy limit.
The limits for such admitted liability insurance should be amounts
somewhat lower than those heretofore suggested by the preferred legislative program (section B). The following limits should be considered: (1) for death, $15,000; (2) for non-fatal personal injuries, an
4 This condition distinguishes "admitted liability insurance" from "personal
accident insurance" which is usually purchased by the traveler for his own
benefit. Both types of policies are payable regardless of the fault of the aircraft
operator or of the insured.
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amount not to exceed $50,000 made up of (a) the expenses directly
attributable to the accident to the extent of $3,000, (b) a specified
sum for designated dismemberments or loss of eyesight, and (c) compensation payments up to $40 per week during the period of incapacity
(impairment of earning capacity), provided that the weekly payment
should cease when an overall individual limit of about $20,000 was
reached; (3) for both fatal and non-fatal injuries to persons on the
ground an overall limit, with appropriate provision for proration, of
from $25,000 to $1,000,000 for all claims arising out of one accident,
varying with the weight of the plane; and (4) for damage to property
on the ground, the actual loss or damage as determined by arbitrators
(or in some other manner) but not to exceed an overall limit of $25,000 to $1,000,000 with respect to one accident, varying with the weight
of the plane.
The statute would not attempt to fix the standard of liability or
a limitation upon the amount recoverable by a passenger or person
on the ground who refused the insurance and elected to sue at law.
Of course, there would be no Federal statute shifting the burden of
persuasion or otherwise lessening the passenger's burden of establishing a common law suit.
The Federal agency should be under no duty to impose any insurance requirements unless and until it had satisfied itself, by investigation, that such insurance was presently desirable in the public
interest. The agency would be empowered to vary insurance requirements from time to time as appeared desirable in the public interest,
to permit aircraft operators to qualify, as self-insurers, or to furnish
surety in lieu of insurance, to prescribe policy terms and limits, and
to fix maximum and minimum premium rates.
The precise cost of. this admitted liability insurance cannot be
estimated with the material available but in view of the nature of
aviation claims at common law it has been said that the cost of such
insurance would not be excessive or a financial burden, to any class
of operator with the possible exception of the private flier.
(b) In effect, this alternative proposal would insure a minimum
recovery for every person injured in person or property by civil aircraft when the aircraft causing the injury carried the prescribed insurance. No maximum would limit the theoretically possible recovery
that the injured party who instituted a suit at law could recover provided he established the liability of the aircraft operator under present
rules of negligence and proved the measure of damages he claimed.
From the aircraft operator's point of view, the carrying of such
insurance would not afford him any concrete protection against large
judgments for injuries and damage which were clearly his fault. Of
course, the operator would have the option of insuring his common
law liability for higher limits at an additional cost. This program has
the merit of simplicity and directness and in practice would protect
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aircraft operators in the vast majority of accidents. It would, moreover,
avoid all constitutional problems as to the type of accident to which
the program could be made applicable.
PROSPECTS FOR IMMEDIATE

REMEDIAL

LIABILITY LEGISLATION

Fundamentally any remedial liability legislation is an attempt to
improve the procedure for administering the common law liability
based upon fault, or is a departure from such liability and an adoption
of one form or another of objective or absolute limited liability. Often
the program for improving the purely legal aspects of the liability
question is supplemented by a feature under which the benefits are to
be secured by a system of compulsory insurance. The various legislative
proposals here recommended are designed to accomplish the desired
objectives by a combination of all the features just enumerated.
Is there a distinct need at this time for some type of special aviation
liability legislation? In the report the author made to the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1941, he concluded that there was such a need, and
recommended that federal legislation should be considered which
would incorporate the foregoing described principles of absolute but
limited liability with all risks to be eventually covered by compulsory
insurance. This was a radical, proposal and one that would have far
reaching effects. As far as can be ascertained that proposal brought
forth no great affirmative enthusiasm from any part of the aviation
industry or from any public organizations. It was put forth in part
to ascertain if others felt that such legislation was needed.
In retrospect, before now advocating any statutory liability program, the author suggests that it might be well to investigate at first
hand the experiences of a representative group of attorneys who have
represented in recent years the victims of aircraft accidents of the
scheduled air carriers, non-scheduled operators and other classes of
flyers, as well as to again consult the aircraft operators and their insurers. Inquiry should be made of the problems the plaintiff's attorneys have had in gathering evidence of the circumstances surrounding
aircraft acidents, of proving negligence, and of reaching settlements
and collecting judgments. As far as I am aware, the victims of aircraft
accidents and their attorneys have not been questioned by any government agency or by any bar association committee or research organization. In their experience lies factual information that may go far to
re-evaluate the immediate need for special aviation liability legislation.

